Liaoshen Campaign
The first of the three decisive campaigns of the Chinese Civil War. Between September and November 1948, Lin Biao's Fourth Field Army encircled and destroyed approximately 470,000 Nationalist troops in Manchuria, securing the entire northeast and — for the first time — giving the PLA numerical superiority over Nationalist forces nationally.
Strategic Context
By mid-1948, the Nationalist forces in Manchuria under General Wei Lihuang were effectively isolated from central China. Years of CCP guerrilla operations had eroded their strength and cut the railway links south. Lin Biao's Fourth Field Army had grown to approximately 700,000 troops — reversing the numerical disadvantage of the war's opening. His plan was to strike Jinzhou first, sealing the Nationalist escape route before encircling the main garrisons at Changchun and Shenyang.
The Battle for Jinzhou
On 12 September, PLA forces began operations across Manchuria. Jinzhou — the key railway hub linking the northeast to north China — fell on 15 October, severing the Nationalist supply line and trapping Wei's army. A relief force under Liao Yaoxiang was intercepted and destroyed west of Shenyang. Changchun surrendered on 19 October without a major battle. Shenyang fell on 2 November, ending the campaign.
Outcome and Significance
In 52 days, the campaign destroyed 47 Nationalist divisions — approximately 470,000 troops — and secured all of Manchuria. The PLA captured large quantities of American-supplied equipment. Nationally, the PLA outnumbered the Nationalist forces for the first time. The encirclement-and-annihilation approach used at Jinzhou became the operational template for the Huaihai and Pingjin campaigns that followed immediately.
Narrative Comparison
| Source | Narrative |
|---|---|
| PRC Official Narrative | The Liaoshen Campaign was a triumph of Mao Zedong's military thought — concentrating superior forces to annihilate the enemy in detail. Lin Biao's decision to strike Jinzhou first, against some internal opposition, exemplified the correct application of the principle of "closing the door before beating the dog." The campaign proved that the people's army could defeat a US-equipped adversary through strategic boldness and political mobilisation. |
| ROC / Taiwan Narrative | The loss of Manchuria resulted from a strategic miscalculation by Chiang Kai-shek in committing large forces to an overextended theatre far from the Nationalist heartland. Commanders on the ground were paralysed by conflicting orders from Nanjing. The decision to hold Changchun and Shenyang as isolated garrisons rather than concentrate forces for a breakout proved fatal. American pressure to avoid conflict also constrained Nationalist operational options. |
| Western Academic Perspective | By September 1948, the Nationalist defeat in Manchuria was nearly overdetermined. Soviet transfers of Japanese weapons after 1945, CCP land reform, and the cumulative effect of Nationalist supply failures had steadily eroded the structural advantages that the KMT had brought to the theatre. Lin Biao's operational skill in striking Jinzhou accelerated the collapse, but the underlying conditions made some form of Nationalist defeat in the northeast all but inevitable. |
Key Milestones
- Campaign begins
Fourth Field Army launches coordinated operations across Manchuria.
- Jinzhou falls
The fall of Jinzhou severs the Nationalist supply line from north China.
- Changchun surrenders
Changchun garrison surrenders without major battle.
- Liao Yaoxiang corps destroyed
The Nationalist relief force under Liao Yaoxiang is encircled and destroyed west of Shenyang.
- Shenyang falls; campaign ends
PLA captures Shenyang, completing the capture of Manchuria.
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