Japan’s Purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the 2012 Anti-Japanese Protests

Background: the sovereignty dispute and the purchase plan

The Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands in Japan, Tiaoyutai/Diaoyutai in Taiwan) lie about 100 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China, Japan and Taiwan all claim them, and Japan has administered them since the United States returned Okinawa in 1972. China holds that the islands have been Chinese since ancient times, were stolen by Japan in 1895 during the First Sino-Japanese War and should have been returned with Taiwan after the Second World War, and says the leaders of the two countries reached an understanding during the 1972 normalisation and 1978 treaty talks to “leave the Diaoyu Dao issue aside for later resolution.” Japan holds that the islands are clearly an inherent territory of Japan under both history and international law: “There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved.”

According to the Congressional Research Service, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara announced in Washington in April 2012 that he intended to buy three of the islands from their private owner, and raised nearly $20 million in donations online. The Japanese government had been leasing the privately owned Uotsuri-jima (Diaoyu Dao), Kita-Kojima and Minami-Kojima since 2002. According to Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura, after Ishihara’s statement the government engaged with the owner and the Tokyo government and at the end of June began considering a direct purchase. On 5 August Taiwan’s leader Ma Ying-jeou proposed an East China Sea Peace Initiative, urging all parties to shelve their differences, resolve the dispute peacefully and develop resources jointly.

Japan’s purchase and the reactions

On 10 September 2012 a Japanese ministerial meeting confirmed that the three islands would be acquired from the owner as soon as possible and held by the Japan Coast Guard. Fujimura said this was simply a transfer of land ownership within Japan’s sovereign territory from a private owner to the government, “not something that should raise any kinds of issues for other countries or regions,” and that the government did not want it to harm Japan–China relations. On 11 September the cabinet approved 2.05 billion yen for the purchase; Fujimura said he had never used the term “nationalization.” The CRS report gives 12 September as the date the government completed the purchase and says Tokyo described the move as intended to keep the islands out of the hands of Ishihara or other nationalists.

China’s Foreign Ministry declared on 10 September that the purchase was a grave violation of China’s territorial sovereignty and “entirely illegal and invalid,” accusing Tokyo of having indulged right-wing forces in stirring up the purchase affair. The same day the Chinese government announced territorial-sea baselines around the islands, and on 13 September deposited the coordinates with the UN Secretary-General. Chinese marine surveillance and fishery vessels then patrolled the waters; Japan said six Haijian vessels entered Japanese territorial waters on 14 September, while China described the patrols as normal operations in waters under its jurisdiction. In Taiwan, Foreign Minister Timothy Yang summoned Japan’s representative on 11 September, recalled Taiwan’s envoy to Japan, Shen Ssu-tsun, and said Taiwan would “absolutely not accept and absolutely not recognize” Japan’s actions.

Anti-Japanese protests and violence

After the purchase, anti-Japanese protests broke out across China, growing from 15 September and continuing on 18 September, the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden Incident. Political scientists Jeremy Wallace and Jessica Chen Weiss counted 377 anti-Japanese protests in 2012 across 208 of China’s 287 prefectural cities. Demonstrators gathered outside the Japanese Embassy in Beijing for days; on 18 September about 50 protesters surrounded the car of US Ambassador Gary Locke as it entered the US Embassy compound, causing minor damage, and the State Department said Chinese authorities had expressed regret.

Some protests turned violent. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary said on 18 September that since 15 September there had been arson and break-ins at Japanese companies, destruction of shop floors and production lines, and looting, and that Japan had lodged further protests. In Xi’an on 15 September, Li Jianli, driving a Japanese-brand car, was surrounded by marchers and struck on the head with a U-lock by 21-year-old Cai Yang, suffering severe injuries; Cai was sentenced to ten years in 2013, and his lawyer described the act as “impulsive and following the crowd, nothing to do with patriotism.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said on 20 September that the protests reflected the Chinese people’s determination to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that China, as a country governed by law, “protects the safety of foreign institutions and personnel in China according to law.” Asked on 21 September about destructive behaviour at the protests, he said the grave situation in relations had been caused entirely by Japan’s announced “purchase” of Diaoyu Dao.

Meanwhile, on 18 September two Japanese citizens landed on Uotsuri-jima and left after warnings from Japanese police and the coast guard. On 25 September some 75 Taiwanese fishing boats escorted by coast guard vessels approached the islands and exchanged water-cannon fire with Japanese patrol boats. The same day China’s State Council Information Office published the white paper “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China.”

Aftermath

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda reportedly later admitted that he had expected the purchase to cause a certain degree of reaction and friction, but that the scale exceeded his expectations. Japan said losses suffered by Japanese companies should in principle be resolved through Chinese legal channels, while it would seek compensation at government level for damage to its embassy and consulates. Many events marking the 40th anniversary of normalised relations were affected. The United States said it took no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands but recognised Japan’s effective administrative control and therefore the applicability of Article 5 of the US–Japan Security Treaty. China’s white paper said its marine surveillance vessels conduct law-enforcement patrols in the waters and its fishery vessels carry out regular patrols and fishery protection.