August 17th Communiqué
On 17 August 1982 the governments of the United States and the People's Republic of China released their third joint communiqué, addressing the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan left unresolved at normalization. The United States stated that it did not seek a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that such sales would not exceed the level of recent years in quality or quantity, and that it intended to reduce them gradually, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In the same weeks, Washington conveyed to Taiwan statements later known as the "Six Assurances."
An Issue Left Open at Normalization
When the United States and the People's Republic of China established diplomatic relations on 1 January 1979, the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan was not settled. In the words of the later communiqué, "the two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again following normalization." The U.S. Taiwan Relations Act, enacted on 10 April 1979, provides that the United States will make defense articles and services available to Taiwan as needed for its self-defense. According to the Congressional Research Service, by 1982 continued arms sales under the Act had become a major irritant in U.S.–PRC relations.
On 30 September 1981, Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, set out further policies for resolving the Taiwan question in a statement that the later communiqué calls the "Nine-Point Proposal." In October 1981, Premier Zhao Ziyang met President Ronald Reagan, and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua met Secretary of State Alexander Haig; the two sides discussed arms sales further during and after those meetings.
Negotiations
U.S. Vice President George Bush visited China from 5 to 9 May 1982. According to the photo album Thirty Years of China–US Relations, he came at a time when both formal talks and informal consultations on arms sales had reached deadlock. On 5 May, Deng Xiaoping told him that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were "a shadow over China–US relations, and today a latent crisis," and that if this knot could be untied, "it would be very favourable to global strategy."
A cable declassified by the U.S. government in 2020 shows that Beijing had demanded that Washington agree to end all arms sales to Taiwan "within a certain period of time," which the United States said it could not accept. On 10 July 1982, Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger informed James Lilley, director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), that Reagan had decided his reply to the message Deng had sent through Bush, and that Ambassador Arthur Hummel had been instructed to deliver it to Deng together with a draft joint communiqué. The approach, the cable said, "does not go significantly beyond our past positions" and did not meet Deng's request for a commitment to end arms sales within a set period. The scholar Jaw-ling Joanne Chang notes that the agreement was reached after ten months of negotiations.
The Communiqué
On 17 August 1982 the two governments released the Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, the third U.S.–China communiqué after the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué and the 1979 communiqué on establishing diplomatic relations. It restated that respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs were the fundamental principles guiding the relationship, as confirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué and reaffirmed at normalization.
The Chinese side reiterated that the Taiwan question was China's internal affair and cited the 1979 Message to Compatriots in Taiwan and the 1981 Nine-Point Proposal as expressions of "a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the motherland." The United States reiterated that it had "no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan,'" and said it "understands and appreciates" China's policy of seeking a peaceful resolution.
On that basis, the sixth paragraph stated that the U.S. government "does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution." The communiqué set no date for ending the sales.
Parallel U.S. Statements and the "Six Assurances"
On 14 July 1982, Lilley, with Reagan's authorization, conveyed to Chiang Ching-kuo a set of statements later known as the U.S. "Six Assurances" to Taiwan. The version that Secretary of State George Shultz cabled to Lilley on 17 August for Taiwan to make public said that the United States had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; had not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan; would not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC. According to Taiwan's Central News Agency, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally made the assurances public on 18 August.
Eagleburger's 10 July cable also instructed Lilley to tell Chiang that, before the end of August, the administration would formally notify Congress of an extension of the F-5E co-production line, and that the first 23 of 66 F-104G fighters to be purchased from West Germany were scheduled for transfer at the end of August.
On the day of the communiqué, Assistant Secretary of State John H. Holdridge testified about it before the Senate, and the next day before the House. The Congressional Research Service notes that he wove the Six Assurances into his testimony in both chambers but neither labelled them as such nor disclosed that Reagan had already offered them to Chiang.
In a public statement on 17 August, Reagan said that the arms sales policy set out in the communiqué was "fully consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act" and that "arms sales will continue in accordance with the act and with the full expectation that the approach of the Chinese Government to the resolution of the Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful." The same day he sent Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger an internal memorandum stating that "the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences," and that "the quality and quantity of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC." The memorandum was declassified in 2019 and published by AIT.
Aftermath and Disputes
The Chinese government's 1993 white paper The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China stated that for more than a decade after the communiqué the U.S. government had not conscientiously implemented its provisions and had repeatedly acted in violation of it, citing the U.S. decision in September 1992 to sell 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan. The Congressional Research Service records that President George H. W. Bush notified Congress of that sale, valued at $5.8 billion, in September 1992, and that some critics at the time argued it violated the 1982 communiqué's provision on reducing arms sales to Taiwan.
In 2020 the U.S. government declassified the Eagleburger and Shultz cables. The Congressional Research Service notes that for nearly 38 years the only publicly released official U.S. text of the Six Assurances had been the one woven into Holdridge's 1982 testimony, and that since 2020 U.S. administrations have described the U.S. one-China policy as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiqués and also the Six Assurances.
Narrative Comparison
| Source | Narrative |
|---|---|
| Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State Council, white paper The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China (1993) | The white paper states that "to resolve the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese and U.S. governments reached agreement through negotiations on 17 August 1982," and quotes the U.S. statement on gradually reducing arms sales "leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution." It argues that the Taiwan Relations Act, "in the form of U.S. domestic legislation, made many provisions contravening the communiqué on establishing diplomatic relations and the principles of international law," and that the U.S. government, "on the basis of this Act, continued to sell arms to Taiwan and interfere in China's internal affairs." After the communiqué, it says, the U.S. government "repeatedly acted in violation of it," and the 1992 decision to sell F-16s "added new obstacles" to China–US relations and to resolving the Taiwan question. It adds that both countries "should cherish the hard-won three joint communiqués." |
| President Reagan, Statement on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan (17 August 1982); internal presidential memorandum (17 August 1982, declassified 2019) | In his public statement Reagan said the communiqué "embodies a mutually satisfactory means of dealing with the historical question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan" and "preserves principles on both sides." He said the United States attached "great significance to the Chinese statement in the communiqué regarding China's 'fundamental' policy"; that the Taiwan question was "a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve"; that the United States would "not interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan"; and that it had "an abiding interest and concern that any resolution be peaceful." His internal memorandum of the same day stated that the talks "were premised on the clear understanding that any reduction of such arms sales depends upon peace in the Taiwan Straits and the continuity of China's declared 'fundamental policy,'" and that "the linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy." |
| Central News Agency, Taiwan (5 April 2017; 18 March 2026) | Explainers by Taiwan's Central News Agency say that, "to lessen the impact on Taiwan" of the August 17th Communiqué, Reagan had AIT Chairman David Dean and Taipei office director James Lilley present six assurances to Chiang Ching-kuo, which the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally made public on 18 August. Its Chinese rendering includes that the United States had not agreed to set an end date for arms sales to Taiwan, had not agreed to Beijing's request for prior consultation on such sales, had not changed its consistent position on Taiwan's sovereignty, and would not pressure Taiwan to negotiate with Beijing. CNA describes the Six Assurances as "mainly offsetting" the communiqué's provision on a year-by-year reduction of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. |
| Richard C. Bush, A One-China Policy Primer (Brookings Institution, 2017) | Richard Bush, a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, writes that the U.S. rhetorical position of "one China, not two" was elaborated in the August 1982 arms sales communiqué, in which the Reagan administration reiterated that it had no intention of pursuing "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." China cited its "fundamental policy of striving for peaceful unification," which the United States said it understood and appreciated; "still, China's stated policy of peaceful reunification did not constitute a renunciation of the use of force." He also notes that in 1982 the Reagan administration told Congress that the United States took no position on Taiwan's sovereignty and that this was an issue for the two sides of the Strait to resolve, which in his view "suggests that the previous U.S. position—that the status of Taiwan was undetermined—had not changed, Chinese views to the contrary notwithstanding." |
Key Milestones
- Taiwan Relations Act enacted
The Act provides that the United States will make defense articles and services available to Taiwan as needed for its self-defense.
- Ye Jianying's statement on Taiwan policy
NPC Standing Committee Chairman Ye Jianying set out further policies for resolving the Taiwan question, referred to in the communiqué as the "Nine-Point Proposal."
- Deng Xiaoping meets George Bush
During Vice President Bush's visit, Deng called the arms sales issue "a shadow" over relations and "a latent crisis."
- U.S. negotiating position set
Eagleburger cabled Lilley that Hummel was to deliver Reagan's reply and a draft communiqué to Deng; the U.S. would not commit to ending arms sales within a set period.
- Lilley conveys the "Six Assurances" to Chiang Ching-kuo
With Reagan's authorization, Lilley told Chiang what the U.S. had not agreed to in its negotiations with the PRC.
- August 17th Communiqué released
Reagan issued a public statement and an internal memorandum the same day; Holdridge testified before the Senate.
- ROC Foreign Ministry publishes the Six Assurances
Holdridge testified before the House the same day.
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Chronicles of Modern China. (2026, October 30). August 17th Communiqué. Retrieved October 30, 2026, from https://www.cmcarchive.org/events/august-17-communique-1982
“August 17th Communiqué.” Chronicles of Modern China. Last modified October 30, 2026. Accessed October 30, 2026. https://www.cmcarchive.org/events/august-17-communique-1982.
Chronicles of Modern China. August 17th Communiqué[EB/OL]. (2026-10-30)[2026-10-30]. https://www.cmcarchive.org/events/august-17-communique-1982.