The February Countercurrent
In February 1967, at a series of Politburo meetings at Huairen Hall chaired by Zhou Enlai, veteran marshals and vice premiers — including Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi, and Ye Jianying — openly challenged the Central Cultural Revolution Group over the purging of veteran cadres, the bypassing of Party leadership, and instability within the military. Mao Zedong sided with the Cultural Revolution Group, labeling the challenge the "February Countercurrent," and the officials involved were denounced and marginalized for years, before being formally rehabilitated as having waged a "righteous struggle" in 1978 and 1981.
Background: Three Points of Principle
By early 1967, the "January Storm" power seizures had spread across China, and a number of veteran party, government, and military leaders had grown alarmed at the pace and methods of the Cultural Revolution. On 19–20 January, the Central Military Commission held a meeting at the Jingxi Hotel in Beijing to discuss whether the army should be subject to the "four bigs" (speaking out freely, airing views fully, writing big-character posters, and holding great debates), exposing sharp disagreement over whether the military could remain insulated from the mass movement. The dispute that followed centered on three questions: whether the Cultural Revolution required continued Party leadership, whether veteran cadres should be purged wholesale, and whether the stability of the armed forces should be preserved.
The February 11 Meeting
On 11 February 1967, at a Politburo meeting at Huairen Hall in Zhongnanhai chaired by Premier Zhou Enlai, marshals and vice premiers including Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Tan Zhenlin, Li Xiannian, and Li Fuchun voiced strong dissatisfaction with the Cultural Revolution Group's conduct, blaming it for the disorder spreading through party and government institutions and for undermining the army's stability.
February 16: Tan Zhenlin's Confrontation
The conflict escalated sharply at the 16 February meeting. When Zhang Chunqiao demurred on committing to protect the deposed Shanghai officials Chen Pixian and Cao Diqiu, saying the matter needed to be put to "the masses," Tan Zhenlin retorted that invoking "the masses" while setting aside Party leadership was nothing more than a pretext for toppling veteran cadres one after another, and declared: "I have made three mistakes in my life: I should not have lived this long, I should not have followed Chairman Mao to make revolution, and I should not have joined the Communist Party." Chen Yi accused Lin Biao's associates of conducting factional activity under the cover of Mao Zedong Thought, while Ye Jianying, slamming the table, argued that veteran cadres were an asset of the Party and the state and questioned the logic of toppling them wholesale for past errors.
Mao's Verdict: "February Countercurrent"
That same night, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Li compiled a transcript of the February 16 meeting and reported it to Mao Zedong. On 18–19 February, Mao convened a meeting at which he sharply rebuked the veteran cadres, insisting the Cultural Revolution could not be reversed. From 25 February to 18 March, the Central Politburo held seven consecutive "political-life criticism meetings" targeting Tan Zhenlin and the others; Zhou Enlai, who had chaired the original meetings, was also compelled to make a self-criticism. Tan Zhenlin was removed from his post and confined, required to submit daily self-criticisms, while Chen Yi was subjected to mass denunciation rallies that left him with lasting physical strain. On 14 March, under the direction of Lin Biao and Chen Boda, some 100,000 people marched through Beijing under the slogan of "striking back at the February Countercurrent." In the aftermath, the Politburo Standing Committee's meetings were effectively suspended, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group took over many of its functions.
Later Reassessment
The verdict against the "February Countercurrent" cadres began to soften after the fall of Lin Biao in 1971, and in 1973 Tan Zhenlin and others had their standing as party and state leaders restored on Mao's instruction. At the Central Committee Work Conference in November 1978, the Party formally decided that the reputations of all comrades who had suffered as a result of the "February Countercurrent" case should be fully restored and their treatment completely redressed. The 1981 "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China" went further, characterizing the February 1967 stand taken by veteran cadres as a "righteous struggle" by senior revolutionaries against the Cultural Revolution's errors.
Narrative Comparison
| Source | Narrative |
|---|---|
| PRC Official Party History (post-1978) | Present-day official Party history, following the 1978 rehabilitation decision and the 1981 Resolution, characterizes the veteran cadres' February 1967 stand as a "righteous struggle" by senior revolutionaries resisting the Cultural Revolution's erroneous practices, in contrast to the label "February Countercurrent" applied to them at the time, which official history now attributes to Lin Biao and the Cultural Revolution Group's manipulation of Mao Zedong. |
| Western Academic Historiography | Scholars such as Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals treat the February Countercurrent as a pivotal test of how far the Cultural Revolution would go in dismantling the existing party-state apparatus, arguing that Mao's siding with the Cultural Revolution Group over senior party and military leaders demonstrated his continued prioritization of revolutionary momentum over institutional stability, even as the episode revealed real limits to elite consensus behind the movement. |
| The Veteran Cadres' Own Account | According to accounts and quotations attributed to the participants themselves, Tan Zhenlin's outburst at the 16 February meeting — including his remark that he had erred in living so long, following Mao into revolution, and joining the Party — and Ye Jianying's table-slamming defense of veteran cadres as "an asset of the Party and the state," reflect the perspective of officials who regarded the wholesale purging of experienced cadres, rather than the "power seizure" rhetoric, as the illegitimate and destructive element of the unfolding Cultural Revolution. |
Key Milestones
- Jingxi Hotel Meeting on the Military and the "Four Bigs"
The Central Military Commission meets to debate whether the "four bigs" of mass mobilization should extend into the armed forces, exposing sharp disagreement.
- First Huairen Hall Meeting
Ye Jianying, Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin, and other veteran leaders voice strong dissatisfaction with the Cultural Revolution Group at a Politburo meeting chaired by Zhou Enlai.
- Second Huairen Hall Meeting: Open Confrontation
Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi, and Ye Jianying clash directly with Zhang Chunqiao and other Cultural Revolution Group members; Tan Zhenlin walks out and refuses to attend further meetings.
- Meeting Transcript Reported to Mao
Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Li compile a transcript of the February 16 meeting and report it to Mao Zedong that same night.
- Tan Zhenlin's Letter to Lin Biao
Tan Zhenlin writes to Lin Biao denouncing Jiang Qing and the Cultural Revolution Group's methods.
- Mao Zedong Condemns the Veteran Cadres
Mao convenes a meeting and sharply criticizes the veteran leaders, declaring the Cultural Revolution beyond question and effectively coining the "February Countercurrent" label.
- Mass Rally to "Strike Back at the February Countercurrent"
Around 100,000 people march through Beijing under Lin Biao and Chen Boda's direction, denouncing the veteran cadres involved in the February meetings.
- Seven Criticism Meetings Conclude
The Central Politburo concludes a series of seven "political-life criticism meetings" against Tan Zhenlin and the other veteran cadres, begun on 25 February.
Last verified: